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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
COMMERCIAL FIXTURES AND FURNISHINGS, INC., 
a Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
) 
Case No. 14700 
-vs-
ELDON ADAMS, an individual, and NEW LIFE 
~EALTH SPA, by and through, ELDON ADAMS, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~·> 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
NATURE OF THE CASE 
Appellant sued Respondent, ELDON ADAMS, for ~e·pr!~ 10! 
sold 
FORSYTH, its principal officer and stockholder. Respoadest•..as~~;: 
'". ,4~~ 
the Lessor of the property under lease to GREAT ~RS, :H!~:~.:J 
to the site of which property the goods in questio~ were del~~c 
i.tf': 
by Appellant. GREAT OUTDOORS, INC. breached its lease ancru~·;;, 
.,, -·~~ 
dent brought action for such breach, terminated theJ lease,· •11.dd;_..!wli&i" 
re-possessed the property pursuant to Court Order iPld Judqme:rit:~' '~ 
Appellant seeks to recover its claim against GREAT OUTDOORS, l'RCiij 
and/or WILLIAM LEWIS FORSYTH from the Respondent, Lessor, on the'l~i 
theory of unjust enrichment. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
Following two pre-trial hearings with no fact~al disputes 
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finally appearing, the matter was submitted to the Court on 
simultaneous motions for summary judgment, supported by simul-
taneous memoranda and argument and reply memoranda of the Appellant 
and Respondent. Judgment of no cause of action was rendered 
against the Appellant and in favor of the Respondent by the Honor-
able GEORGE E. BALLIF, District Judge. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Respondent seeks to have the judgment of the trial Court 
affirmed by the Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent, ELDON ADAMS, is the owner of property at 1640 
South State Street, in Orem, Utah. On or about March 1, 1974, 
Respondent leased said property, by written lease, to GREAT OUTDOORS, 
INC., a Utah corporation. Under the terms of the lease, the Lessee, 
at its sole expense, agreed to complete such improvments in and 
upon the property as its business needs might require and to promptly 
pay and discharge all costs and expenses incident thereto, to the 
end that no liens would be placed upon or against the leased properq 
Thereafter, GREAT OUTDOORS, INC., the Lessee, and/or WILLIAM 
LEWIS FORSYTH, its principal officer and stockholder, on their 
own behalf and on their own initiative, contracted with the Appellant 
for the purchase of materials to be used in the completion of such 
improvements, which contract was negotiated with the understanding 
between the Lessee and/or WILLIAM LEWIS FORSYTH and the Appellant 
that the Lessee was and would continue to be solely responsible for 
the payment of the price of such materials. Materials were then 
-2-
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furnished by the Appellant to the Lessee and were subsequently in-
corporated in the building on the leased premises by the Lessee. 
The Lessee subsequently defaulted in the performance of its 
covenants in the lease of the Respondent's property and action was 
instituted by the Respondent in the Fourth Judicial District Court 
of Utah County to terminate the lease and regain possession of the 
property. By judgment of the Court, the lease was terminated 
and the property restored to the Respondent. The Appellant filed 
no claim of lien against the property or the interest of the Lessee· '' 
therein and the time limited for filing such lien has expired~ 
The Respondent was not privy to any contraat between the ··· 
Appellant and the Lessee, and the Appellant has Dever instituted 
any action to recover the price of said goods frp the Lessee,·11; 
GREAT OUTDOORS, INC., and/or WILLIAM LEWIS FORSYfH, but instead"'~., 
seeks to recover its claim, from the Lessor of th• property. , """ 
ARGUMENT 
.-., 
POINT I 
THE LESSOR OF PROPERTY IS NOT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE COSTS OF 
REPAIRS OR IMPROVEMENTS THERETO INCURRED BY THE'LESSEE. 
A tenant who makes repairs to or improvements on demised 
premises does so at his own cost, and he cannot involve his land-
lord in the expense thereof without the landlord's consent (49 Am 
Jur 2d 702, Section 765). A tenant has no inherent power to bind 
his landlord for the cost of improvments or repairs made by him 
to the premises, and, as a general rule, the tenant's creditors 
have no greater right to charge the land with the value thereof 
than the tenant would have. (49 Am Jur 2d 702, ?ection 765, citing 
AMERICAN BONDING COMPANY v. PUEBLO INVESTMENT COMPANY (CA. 8), 150 
-3-
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F. 17; WALTER V. SPERRY, 86 Conn. 474, 85 Atlantic 739; BROWN v. 
WARD, 221 N. C. 344, 200 SE 2d 324; GRIZZLE v. RUNBECK, 74 Arizona 
92, 244 P 2d 1160; KNAUSS v. HALE, 164 Idaho 218, 131 p 2d 292). 
In the absence of special circumstances, the tenant cannot, by a 
contract with a third person, subject the landlord's reversion to 
a mechanic's lien for the cost of improvements upon the demised 
premises, although, of course, the Lessee's own interest in the 
leasehold might be subject to such lien. 
Section 765). 
(49 Arn Jur 2d 702, 
Our mechanic's lien law, Section 38-1-3 Utah Code Annotated, 
1953, as amended, recognizes that such liens can attach "only 
to such interest as the owner may have in the property." (See 
BUEHNER BLOCK COMPANY v. NICK GLEZOS, et al, 6 Utah 2d 226; 310 
P 2d 517, wherein the Court recognizes that the Lessee's interest 
under a lease may be reached through a mechanic's lien, but not 
the interest of the Lessor, under normal circumstances). On 
principle, there is no better reason why a creditor dealing with 
a Lessee should be permitted to pursue his claim against the 
Lessor, personally. 
In the absence of statute or of an agreement between the 
parties, there is no obligation on the part of the Lessor to pay 
the Lessee for improvements erected by the latter upon the demised 
premises, even though the improvements are such that by reason of 
their annexation to the freehold they become a part of the realty 
and cannot be removed by the Lessee. So, in the absence of 
statute or of any agreement as to improvements, the Lessee is not 
entitled to a lien therefor, in view of the rule that the Lessor J 
-4- J Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
assumes no liability for improvements made unless he expressly 
agrees to be responsible therefor. Moreover, ordinarily, creditors 
of a tenant have no greater right to charge the land with the value 
of improvements made by the tenant than the tenant would have, 
(49 Am Jur 2d 718, Section 777; annotation at 25 ALR 2d 885, Sections 
1 and 3) and the mere consent of the Lessor to the. :making of such 
improvements does not render the Lessee the agent of the Lessor so 
as to bind the Lessor to pay the costs thereof. (Annotation 163 
AI,R 992). In order for a tenant (or tenant's creditor) to recover 
for the cost of repairs, alterations, or improvements there :litustrts 
be a distinct agreement on the part of the landil'.o~a to pay fer· ,::::; 
! 
them. (49 Am Jur 2d 828, Section 860, citing ZANris~v·; FREOD7.''·~ 
HOTEL COMPANY, 256 Michigan 578, 240 N.W. 83, 80 Jlilt 534). 
. ' . 
Directly in point in connection with the fore,~ing propos&~ 
,;··-·,t ,,;,,, 
is tl)e case of HOWARD v. SOCIETA DI UNIONE E BENBFICENZA ITM.I.!UilR( 
et al, a California case reported at 145 P 2d 694, where·the G9ull~ 
said: 
"We are cited to no authorities which justify a conclusio.n •l 
that under evidence such as was adduced in this case, appell-
ant is liable for the debts of the association merely b~cause 
the structure was erected upon its land with its consent. 
There is no evidence that plaintiff's assignors relied upon 
the agreement between the society and the assqciation or 
upon any conduct or representation or inducem~nt on the 
part of the society or upon the fact that the land upon . 
which the structures were erected belonged to the society.; ••• 
There is no evidence that the society ever as~umed or agreed 
to pay any of the debts of the association. Testimony is 
to the contrary and there is no evidence from which any 
contract between the society and the creditors can be im-
plied or upon which an equitable lien can be premised." 
In the case before this Court, it is clear that there was no 
reliance whatever by the Appellant on the credit of the Respondent 
and, in fact, the lease itself expressly imposed upon the tenant 
-5-
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alone the responsibility for the payment of the costs of any im-
provements or repairs made to or upon the property by it. 
"The a7t or act~ from which the law implies any contract, 
must, in every instance, be voluntary and the law will 
never imply a promise to pay where it would be unjust to 
the pa7ty to.whom it would imputed and contrary to equity 
so to imply it. Further, the law will not imply a promise 
against the express declaration of the party to be charged 
made at the time of the supposed under taking .•... " (66 ~ 
Jut 2d 944, Section 2) 
While the Appellant in this Court takes the position that the 
case is bottomed on the principle of "unjust enrichment" and that 
the provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code and other statutory 
laws of the State of Utah are inapplicable, this position is con-
trary to the position taken by it at the trial level where copious 
references to the Uniform Commercial Code were set out in the 
Appellant's trial memoranda. It is submitted, however, that in 
considering the question from the equitable standpoint of "unjust 
enrichment" as applied to a third party who was not privy to the 
contract or transaction between the Appellant and the Lessee of 
Respondent's property who purchased the Appellant's goods reference 
to some provisions of the Utah Uniform Commercial code are pertinent 
and appropriate. For example, as an alternative to a money judgment 
against the Respondent on the theory of "unjust enrichment" the Appt 
lant has alleged that it is entitled to enter upon the premises and 
remove its property. Title 70 A-9-313, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, 
as amen?ed, provides in part: 
"(l) the rules of this section do not apply to goods incor-
porated into a structure in the manner of lumber, bricks, 
tile, cement, glass, metal work, and the like, and no 
security interest in them exists under this chapte: unless 
the structure remains personal property under applicable 
law ••••. " 
-6-
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The above cited section further provides under sub-paragraph 
tllree (3) thereof that even where a security interest attaches to 
goods after they become fixtures, such security interest, if any, 
is invalid against: 
"Any person with an interest in the real estate at the time 
the security interest attaches to the goods and who has not 
in writing, consented to the security interest or disclaimed 
an interest in the goods as fixtures." · 
It is clear, therefore, that the seller of goods which becq1J1e_ 
L ~ .>· 
incorporated into a structure on land owned by a tqird party i~ 1 • 
the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work, and 
J. .,_- • 
the like, obtains no security interest in such property except Qn° 
the basis of a duly executed and filed security ~n,trument and 
i!.t· 
financing statement perfected by the seller as prQvided Jpy tit>l.e : . .:o 
'•' '.,. ?!'' 
70A-9-302, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, fnd even if ~~ 
~ l~~1i 
security interest in the property is perfected tllr•ugh t.)le ex•ct1Jt:f4.~"J'" 
; '.·~ ' ~ t1~•· 
and filing of such security instrument and financil'lg f.tatement, ::(~ 
· · l 'd · t ·th · t · t 4 th real '"_¥ .. J,1' .... · is inva i as agains any person wi an in eres +n e . , 
~ 1.'~~~ 
estate at the time the security interest attached f,o the goods 'lf·1 
unless tile owner of such real estate consented, in writing, to 
such security interest or disclaimed an interest in the goods as 
fixtures, neither of which actions has been taken PY the Res-
pondent in this case, who is the owner of the realty. If .there 
is no security interest, therefore, in the Appellant as against 
the actual purchaser of the goods, there can certainly be n9 
security interest in those goods as against the Lessor of the 
property which would entitle the Appellant to enter upon the 
premises and remove the goods therefrom. 
-7-
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, 
Further, the Uniform Commercial Code provides that the seller 
may reserve title or collect on delivery, but if neither procedure 
is employed, the result is a sale on credit and title passes to the 
buyer on delivery. (70A-2-310 and 401, Uniform Commercial Code, 
UCA 1953, as amended.) In the instant case, the Appellant did not 
reserve any title and failed to collect full payment for the goods 
on delivery. As a result title passed directly to the Lessee-buyer, 
Title 70A-9-113 of the Uniform Commercial Code (UCA 1953 as amended) 
also specifically provides that when a debtor has obtained pas-
session of goods or materials from a seller, no security interest 
in such materials can arise or be claimed by the seller without 
an appropriate security instrument and financing statement duly 
perfected, and even in that case, such security interest wbuld be 
ineffective as against the owner of the realty. All of these 
sections negate, at least by inference, any valid claim of the 
Appellant to the property or against the Respondent, personally, 
predicated on principles of "unjust enrichment" or otherwise. 
POINT II 
THERE WAS NO UNJUST ENRICHMENT OF THE RESPONDENT IN THIS 
CASE SUCH AS TO RENDER HIM RESPONSIBLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF 
THE APPELLANT'S CLAIM. 
Out of this entire transaction, the Respondent has sustained 
a substantial loss. He has not profited in any degree from the 
actions of his tenant. 
One is ~unjustly enriched by retaining benefits involun-
tarily acquired which law and equity give him absolutely without 
any obligation on his part to make restitution (66 Am Jur 2d 946, 
Section 3, citing BUELL v. ORION STATE BANK, 327 Michigan 43, 41 j 
-8- j Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
• 
NW 2d 472; MEHL v. NORTON, 201 Minnesota 203, 275 NW 843, 113 ALR 
1055). Further, a basic principle underlying the rules in regard 
to restitution and "unjust enrichment" is that a person who offi-
ciously confers a benefit upon another is not entitled to restitution 
therefor. Policy ordinarily requires that a perpon who has con-
ferred a benefit either by way of giving anothe~ services, or~ 
adding to the value of his land, or by paying hi~ debt, or even by 
transferring property to him, should not be permitted to require 
the other to pay therefor, unless the one confer~ing the benefit 
had a valid reason for so doing. Where a person· has officiously 
conferred a benefit upon another, the other may l)e enricmed'·h1tt"' 
is not considered to be unjustly enriched. The !'Ule thus ··hai;"'tie: · 
effect of penalizing those who thrust benefits uJ'Ol'l others, ii.ea~'' 
protecting persons who have had benefits thrust upon 
without admitting, that there was a "benefit" in the 
In other words, any party has a right to decline 
.i 
to perform an act on his account and he is not l:i.able under ..:~~'";~·: i . ~ . . 
contract" for benefits forced upon him, especially where µiereVas ."' ' .. 
no request by the Respondent for what the Appellant did and th~ 
Appellant occupied the position of a "volunteer", (66 Am Jur'*' 
948, Section 5). 
_,t;\'-"_tl _.~;. - ,. 
"The mere fact that a third person benefits from a contraet 
between two othet persons does not make such third person 
liable in quasi-contract, unjust enrichment, or restitution." 
(66 Alli Jur 2d 960, Section 16, citing: UTSCHIG v. McCLONE, 
16 Wisconsin 2d 506, 114 NW 2d 854). 
"Moreover, where a third person benefits from a contract 
entered into between two others persons, in the absence of 
some misleading act by the third person, the ~ere failure 
of performance by one of the contracting parties does not 
give rise to a right of restitution against the third person." 
-9-
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(66 Am Jur 2d 960, Section 16, citing: UTSCHIG v. McCLONE, 
supra). 
"In other words, a person who has conferred a benefit upon 
another, by the performance of a contract with a third per-
son, is not entit~ed to restitution from the other merely 
because of the failure of performance by the third person." 
(66 Am Jur 2d 960, Section 16, citing: RESTATEMENT, RESTI-
TUTION, Section 110). 
"Ordinarily, the law imposes liability to pay for services 
rendered by another only when the person for whose benefit 
they were conferred requested their rendition. As a gen-
eral rule, where a person performs labor for another with-
out the latters request, however beneficial such labor 
may be, he cannot recover therefor." (66 Am Jur 2d 966, 
Section 23, citing: TILLEY v. COOK COUNTY, 108 U.S. 155, 
2 6 L. Ed • 3 7 4) • 
Before there can be a contract implied for services rendered 
and accepted there must, of course, be in fact an acceptance. 
Moreover, the party sought to be charged must be in a situation 
where he is entirly free to elect whether he will or will not 
accept the work, and where such election will or may influence 
the conduct of the other party with reference to the work itself. 
Where a structure is permanently affixed (or a repair made) to 
real property belonging to an individual without his consent or 
request, he cannot be held responsible because of its subsequent 
use. It becomes his by being annexed to the soil, and he is not 
obliged to remove it to escape liability. He is not deemed to 
have accepted it so as to incur an obligation to pay for it, 
merely because he has not chosen to tear it down, but has seen 
fit to use it. (66 Am Jur 2d 969, Section 24, citing: PARSHLEY 
v. THIRD M. E. CHURCH, 147 N.Y. 583, 42 N.E. 15; ZOTTMAN v. 
SAN FRANCISCO, 20 Cal. 96; SUTTON v. UNITED STATES, 256 U.S. 
575, 65 L. Ed. 1099, 41 S. Ct. 563, 19 ALR. 403) · 
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POINT III 
THERE CANNOT BE AN EXPRESS AND IMPLIED CONTRACT FOR THE SAME 
THING EXISTING AT THE SAME TIME. 
In this case, it is undisputed that there was an express 
contract between the Appellant and GREAT OUTDOORS, INC., the Lessee 
of the property, and/or its principal officer and 11tockholder, for 
the furnishing of the materials upon which the Appellant's clai~ 
against the Respondent is based. It is only when parties do not 
. ·" 
' ·' 
expressly agree, that the law interposes and raise11 a promi8,~· 
1
;.<., :;~ 
and no agreement can be implied where there is an express agr~t , :11 
.. ,/) ~ ·:.)~ 
existing. (66 Am Jur 2d 948, Section 6, citing: VERDI v HELltBJt ·· 1 
STATE BANK, 57 Utah 502, 196 Pac. 225, 15 ALR 6(11. In ~ ~? .. ; ._;;. 
cited Utah case, the Court said: ·~,.~1,. .: 
"It ii> axiomatic that where an express contrac:t exisb:··~~f.; . ;·~.;~.,.;,;·· .. 
may not be implied." . '· w ~ · .,·'f;i 
. ~ -=~~--,~.. , .~~:~ 
Thus, an express contract precludes the existilllce of a ,._,_,.. · •" 
~ "', ,. ~ 
contract implied by law or a quasi-contract:. (66 1111 Jur 2d 94!~'~1!. '.-4 
Section 6, citing: numerous cases from the U.S. 811.preme"Couz:t · ;;1l 
and various State Courts). Inasmuch as the funda.11•ntal ba1d.s .. af;-,$ 
a cliilim of "unjust enrichment" is "implied contrac~", that claim·;;. 
in the instant fact situation is untenable. 
POINT IV 
APPELLANT CANNOT PROCEED IN AN EQUITABLE ACTION AGAINST THE 
lmSPONDENT OWNER AND LESSOR OF THE PROPERTY UJON WHICH T~ 
IMPROVEMENTS WERE MADE WITHOUT FIRST EXHAUSTING ITS LEGAL 
!mMEDIES AGAINST THE PARTY WHO EXPRESSLY CONTRACTED FOR THB 
MATERIALS. 
The Appellants action against Respondent is in the nature 
of a creditors bill or suit and jurisdiction for such a proceeding 
can be acquired, if at all, only after the Appellant has exhausted 
-11-
.. ,..~ ... ,·.,
'. ' "' "~ 
<';;; 
' ;>~ 
,,, 
~:~ 
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all of its remedies at law and demonstrates this fact to the Court, 
It is the established general rule that a creditor cannot come into 
equity to obtain satisfaction of his claim out of property not 
reachable by normal legal process until he has exhausted his remedie 
at law and shown them to be unavailing, and he must allege and 
prove the fact of such exhaustion as a condition precedent to in-
voking the aid of equity. (21 Am Jur 2d 9, Section 7). Moreover, 
it is the rule that before he can come into equity, the creditor 
must have exhausted his legal remedies against the real, as well 
as the personal, estate of the principal debtor. 
9, Section 7). 
(21 Am Jur 2d 
In view of the foregoing general rule, a creditor who seeks 
equitable relief to accomplish that purpose must, in order to com-
ply with that rule, not only obtain a judgment against the principal 
debtor as a condition precedent to his right to such relief, but 
must, in addition, be able to show that an execution has been issued 
in the form and manner required by law and has been returned un-
satisfied in whole or in part. His complaint in equity must contain: 
an allegation to this effect or show a legal and sufficient excuse 
for not doing so. (21 Am Jur 2d 18, Section 21.) See also, SEFTON 
v. SAN DIEGO TRUST AND SAVINGS BANK, 106 P 2d 974, in which the 
Court held that a "creditors bill" is an extraordinary proceeding 
in equity and can only be resorted to after a judgment creditor 
has exhausted all his legal remedies and has failed to collect his ' 
judgment, or it is made to appear that legal remedies would be un-
availing. In the case before this Court, the Appellant has nei theri 
alleged nor proved such precedent action or any reason why such 
action would have been unavailing. 
-12-
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POINT V 
ANY CLAIM OF THE APPELLANT AGAINST THE RESPONDENT is BARRED 
BY THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS. 
The Claim of the Appellant against the Respondent1s essen-
tially a c1~im that the Respondent is required to ~nswe~ for the 
debt of another and any claim in this category is required by the 
statute of frauds to be in writing. (25-5-4 and 2~-5-5, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953). 
The principal cases of FLEMING v. WINEBERG, 455 P 2d 600, 
and PASCHALL'S INC. v. J. P. DOZIER, 407, SW 2d 150, cited by 
Appellant are not analogous to the case before thi1t Coµrt and do~ ''··' 
constitute precedents supportive of the position qf 11-h~ ApPell.U~_ /:j# 
, I --.-·- ;'>~ The FLEMING v. WINEBERG case involv~d an action by a seller of ._tile,';~ 
. . . - ~:".;;·:;/¥) 
to compel the assignee of the buyer to pay fo;i: , tht:; ! lives-tock._ . ·'jf} 
The cattle in that case were sold under a title r~~. aininq cont:raQ$ .:.~~~,J 
which entitled the seller to repossess his .security in pie eveat .... · .. :·,: 
of non-payment and is not remotely in point with tlle 6cts of tbe" rii 
present case. The PASCHALL' S, INC. v. J. P. DOZIJ!lJi case turned ·· .,. 
primarily on the relationship between the defendan• owner of the 
property and the purchaser of the goods and serviaos, who was bis 
daughter, and the unjust enrichment attributed to tnat transactloa 
was predicated solely upon that relationship. 
CONCLUSION 
The inescapable conclusion from the facts of this case and 
the arguments and citations presented is that the ~otion of the 
Respondent for summary judgment of no cause of action as against 
the Appellant was properly granted and judgment of the trial Court 
-13-
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to that effect should be affirmed. The facts of this case are 
not consistent with any conclusion that a judgment based on 
"unjust enrichment" against the Respondent, who was not privy to 
the contract betweeen the Appellant and the Lessee of the prope'rty, 
is warranted or justified on any equitable consideration and the 
judgment of the trial Court should, therefore, be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
V. PERSHING NELSON 
ALDRICH, NELSON, & WEIGHT 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84601 
Attorney for Defendant - Respond 
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